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From 1961 to the present, Ghana’s gross domestic product (GDP) change deviated 
significantly (more than 5.8 percent) from that of the region eight times; of these eight 
deviations, four were positive, outperforming the region, and four were negative, 
underperforming the region. This study utilizes process tracing in order to test whether 
economic policies—protectionist and liberal—had any impact on those deviations. This 
study shows that every negative deviation year was preceded by protectionist policies, 
and, with one exception (explained by currency devaluation), every positive deviation 
year was preceded by economic liberalization policies. This relationship suggests that the 
nature of economic policies (liberal versus protectionist) do not necessarily cause large, 
acute GDP movement, but they may be prerequisites for significant GDP movement in 
any given year.     
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In 1966, Ghana’s GDP1 growth rate was -4.26 percent. This was the worst growth 
rate in all of West Africa and the fifth worst2 in the world. Over the course of the 
following decade, Ghana’s economy collapsed, and at one point (1975) its GDP growth 
rate dropped to a mind-boggling -12.4 percent. Yet, somehow, over the subsequent four 
decades, Ghana managed to change course, recently achieving some impressive 
economic numbers. In 2011, for example, the country enjoyed a GDP growth rate—when 
measured in constant prices in the national currency –of 15.01 percent, making it the third 
fastest growing economy in the world. And when measured in current prices, the GDP 
growth rate for Ghana for 2011 was 20.1 percent, making it the fastest growing economy 
in the world.  
Yes, much of the growth for that year was due to oil revenues from the Jubilee oil 
field, which began pumping oil in December 2010. But oil alone does not explain 
Ghana’s recent impressive performance. In fact, if oil revenues are excluded from the 
calculation, Ghana’s GDP was still 7.5 percent for 2011.3 So even if oil revenue is 
discounted, Ghana still outperformed 70 percent of the rest of the world’s economies in 
2011. And 2012’s numbers look promising as well. The 2012 estimate from the World 
Bank anticipates a GDP of 7.9 percent. Even this “downturn” from the stratospheric 
numbers of 2011 places Ghana as the nineteenth fastest growing economy in the world. 
2011 and 2012 are of course just a snapshot, so consider this broader perspective: 
from 1984–2010, Ghana’s average growth rate was 5.2 percent, while Sub-Saharan 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all GDP data in this paper comes from World Bank and reflects constant 
prices in the national currency. The World Bank, “GDP Growth,” The World Bank, accessed August 9, 
2013, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
2 Only Syria, Zambia, Myanmar, and Algeria had slower growth rates in 1966. 
3 Ferdinand Bakoup, Republic of Ghana Country Strategy Paper (Accra, Ghana: African Development 
Bank, 2012). 
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Africa grew at a 3.2 percent rate.4 And, perhaps even most telling, consider the World 
Bank’s bestowment of “middle income” status to Ghana in November 2010.5  
This spectacular economic turnaround begs the question: Why did the economy 
improve so dramatically? One of the most common answers to this question is economic 
liberalization. Specifically, this explanation states that Structural Adjustment Programs6 
instituted by the IMF and World Bank, combined with currency devaluation and smaller 
government, are responsible for Ghana’s recent economic prosperity.  
The Ghanaian government experimented with a number of different economic 
policies—mostly socialist policies, with a few notable economic liberalization policies—
during its first 25 years of existence, but it never really committed to liberal economic 
policies until 1983. And over the course of the following years, no African country stuck 
to those policies more closely than Ghana.7 So Ghana makes a good case study to 
evaluate the impact of economic liberalization.  
Much has been written on the topic—all of which will be summarized in the 
literature review—but the debate over whether reforms worked continues. The intent of 
this study is to test the economic liberalization explanation using a unique methodology. 
To this end, this study will focus on years in which Ghana’s GDP growth deviated 
significantly from that of the region.8 There are 51 years of available economic data from 
the World Bank (1961 to 2011). During that time, Ghana’s GDP growth rate deviated 
significantly from the regional growth rate eight times: 1966, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 
1981, 1984, and 2011. Of those deviations, four were “positive” for Ghana: 1978, 1981, 
                                                 
4 1984 is generally considered the beginning of Ghana’s economic turnaround, and 2010 is a useful 
end-date because oil played a minimal role in Ghana’s economy that year. 
5 World Bank Group, “Ghana,” World Bank Group, accessed March 7, 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana. 
6 Structural adjustment programs were designed to restore macroeconomic balance, establish realistic 
exchange rates, remove quantitative controls, and reduce taxes on agriculture. See Ho-Won Jeong, “Ghana: 
Lurching Toward Economic Rationality,” World Affairs 159, no. 2 (October, 1996): 64.  
7 Ho-Won Jeong, “Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana: A Contested Political Agenda,” Africa Today 
42, no. 4 (December 1995): 82. 
8 For example, in 1978, Ghana’s growth rate was 8.5 percent; the regional growth rate was 1.2 percent. 
So the deviation, the difference between the two, is 7.3 percent, a number that far exceeds most years. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, 1978 is considered a GDP deviation period. 
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1984, and 2011. That is, Ghana’s economy improved dramatically relative to economies 
in the rest of the region. The other four years were “negative” deviations as Ghana’s GDP 
growth rate declined relative to the region. For this study, a “significant” deviation is one 
that meets or exceeds 5.8 percent. 
The 5.8 percent threshold was selected because the deviation in 1984 was 5.8 
percent. This is a good starting point because 1984 was the first full year after the 
implementation of the most dramatic economic liberalization policies ever seen in Ghana. 
The years in which the deviation exceeded this threshold are significant and need to be 
examined. The years in which the threshold did not exceed 5.8 percent are important of 
course, but less so, and cannot be examined due to the limited scope of this study. 
 
Table 1.   GDP Percent Change from 1961 to 20129 
                                                 




Figure 1.  Years of Significant GDP Growth Deviation Relative to the Region10 
These eight deviations are important because they highlight years when causal 
factors influenced economic conditions in Ghana, but not in the rest of the region. On the 
other hand, when Ghana’s GDP growth approximated that of the region—which is 
demonstrated when the numbers show little deviation—then universal regional factors are 
assumed to be responsible. When this occurs, then Ghana-specific causal factors cannot 
be isolated. For example, consider 2008. According to Figure 1, Ghana’s GDP and Sub-
Saharan Africa’s GDP both experienced a sharp decline over the previous year; this was 
almost certainly due to the worldwide economic recession. Universal regional factors like 
the worldwide recession of 2008 are important, but they are not helpful in determining 
what is unique about Ghana. Rather, the more important factors for this present study are 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
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the periods in which large deviations occurred. Ghana-specific factors were present 
during those deviation periods, and they caused Ghana’s economy to perform differently 
than the economies in the rest of the region. This study closely evaluates each of the 
deviation years in order to determine whether liberal economic reforms were responsible 
for the large deviations. The reversal of liberal economic reforms and the implementation 













II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The IMF and World Bank implemented the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) 
for Ghana from 1983 to 1986. The intent of this market-oriented program was to 
strengthen Ghana’s weak economy. In 1986, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 
was instituted for Ghana in order to complement the ERP.11 Other economic 
liberalization policies were implemented prior to 1983, but these two programs—the ERP 
and the SAP—make up the core of economic liberalization efforts in Ghana, and for this 
reason, the literature focuses on these particular programs. 
There is quite a debate on the effectiveness of this economic liberalization. Some 
of the literature covers Ghana, specifically, and some of it covers the region. In both 
cases, economic liberalization has its proponents as well as its critics. The purpose of the 
following review is to briefly cover the different positions in the scholarly community. 
One of the most widely reviewed arguments in support of economic liberalization 
in Africa is a report from the World Bank entitled, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results, and the Road Ahead.12 This report is of course an endorsement of structural 
adjustment in Africa. To support this position, the study cites the economic improvement 
of the six nations that most closely followed the Bank’s policy prescriptions from 1981–
1991—Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. According to 
the report, these six countries experienced a median increase of nearly two percentage 
points in their GDP growth rates from 1981–1991.13 The clear implication is that the 
extent to which reforms are implemented has a direct impact on the performance of the 
economy in any given state. And notable for this present study is the conclusion that 
structural adjustment worked in Ghana. 
                                                 
11 Augustin Kwasi Fosu, Emerging Africa: The Case of Ghana (Paris: The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2000), 3. 
12 The World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead (Washington DC: 
The World Bank, 1994) 1. 
13Ibid.  
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A number of scholars—including Sepehri (1994), Ponte (1995), and Schatz 
(1994)—have taken issue with the methodology of the World Bank report.14 
Nevertheless, the report stands as an important work in the literature (if for no other 
reason than the debate it generated).  
There are other important contributions as well. Fosu (2000) makes the case that 
Ghana’s economy responded positively to the ERP and the SAP.15 He cites a number of 
reasons for his position. For example, he shows that exports and imports both responded 
positively to Ghana’s liberalization program. Additionally, he shows that three important 
indicators—growths in GDP, per capita GDP, and investment—are all larger during 
periods of economic liberalization than they are for protectionist periods.16 
Abdulai and Huffman (2000) found that structural adjustment policies in Ghana 
have had a positive effect on rice farming in Ghana.17 Boafo-Arthur (1999) contends that, 
for Ghana, SAP is an “indispensable economic tool.”18 Callaghy (1988) writes that 
Ghana has “instituted the most successful and sustained neo-classical reform effort on the 




                                                 
14 Ardeshir Sepehri, “Back to the Future? A Critical Review of ‘Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results and the Road Ahead,’” Review of African Political Economy 21, no. 62 (December, 1994): 559–
568; Stefano Ponte, “The World Bank and ‘Adjustment in Africa,’” Review of African Political Economy 
22, no. 66 (December, 1995): 539–558; Sayre P. Schatz, “Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Failing Grade 
so Far,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 4 (December, 1994): 679–692.  
15 Augustin Kwasi Fosu, Emerging Africa: The Case of Ghana (Paris: The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2000), 3. 
16 Ibid., 24. 
17 Awudu Abdulai and Wallace Huffman, “Structural Adjustment and Economic Efficiency of Rice 
Farmers in Northern Ghana,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 48, no. 3 (April, 2000): 503–
520. 
18 Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of 
Continuity,” African Studies Review 42, no. 2 (September 1999): 66. 
19 Thomas M. Callaghy, “Debt and Structural Adjustment in Africa: Realities and Possibilities,” Issue: 
A Journal of Opinion 16, no. 2 (1988): 17. 
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of implementation, can be considered a “considerable initial success.”20 Toye (1991) 
concludes that Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Program was the most successful in 
Africa.21 
Others disagree about the effectiveness of adjustment in Ghana. For example, 
Brydon (1999) argues that the policies of the IMF and the World Bank in Ghana are not 
working.22 Others, speaking more broadly about the region as a whole, are quite critical 
as well. Ponte (1996) writes a scathing assessment of adjustment in Africa.23 Carmody 
(1998) judges adjustment a total failure because it has led to “the autonomous 
development of the trade and financial sectors, to the detriment of production.”24 Loxley 
(1990 and 1995) is very critical of structural adjustment in Africa;25 he concludes that 
Ghana’s economic recovery in the 1980s was going to happen even if adjustment had not 
occurred.26 Schatz (1994) suggests that the World Bank’s policies may have actually 
hindered economic growth in Africa.27 And Osabu-Kle (2000) even goes so far as to 
claim that adjustment in Africa is not even really about economics. Rather, he argues, it is 
about the struggle for power between the Bretton Woods institutions and African 
leaders.28 
                                                 
20 Nii K. Sowa, Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Ghana (London: Overseas Development Institute, 
1996); However, Sowa does acknowledge that the programs were—at the time of his writing—beginning to 
show signs of faltering. 
21 John Toye, “Ghana,” in Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending in the 1980s 
ed. P. Mosley, J. Harrigan, and J. Toye (New York: Routledge, 1991): 155.  
22 Lynne Brydon. “‘With a Little Bit of Luck...’ Coping with Adjustment in Urban Ghana, 1975–90,” 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 69, no. 3 (1999): 367.  
23 Stefano Ponte, “The World Bank and ‘Adjustment in Africa,’” Review of African Political Economy 
22, no. 66 (December 1995): 539–558. 
24Pádraig Carmody, “Constructing Alternatives to Structural Adjustment in Africa,” Review of African 
Political Economy 25, no. 75 (March 1998): 25.  
25 John Loxley, “A Review of Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead,” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 29, no. 2 (1995): 266–271. 
26John Loxley, “Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia,” Review of 
African Political Economy no. 47 (Spring 1990): 8–27. 
27 Sayre P. Schatz, “Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Failing Grade so Far,” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 32, no. 4 (December 1994): 691. 
28 Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle, “The Politics of One-Sided Adjustment in Africa,” Journal of Black 
Studies 30, no. 4 (March 2000): 515–533. 
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Others are more measured in their judgments. Sepehri (1994) contends that 
market-friendly adjustment in Africa has not worked, but reform based on institution-
building and technical capacity has worked.29 Sparks (1995) writes that SAPs have, at a 
minimum, arrested the region’s dramatic economic decline.30 Hilson (2004) argues that 
ERP and SAP have made the investment climate in Ghana “too attractive,” and as a 
result, foreign multinationals are profiting far more than Ghana’s GDP is improving.31 
Amponsah (2000) writes that SAP reforms have been somewhat successful, but private 
businesses have not responded to these reforms because they are concerned about the 
volatility of the institutional environment.32 Jeong (1996) also gives a mixed review of 
economic reforms in Ghana. He contends that the ERP successfully moderated high 
inflation and reduced government deficits, but institutional reforms have not been 
successful.33 
Kraus (1991) concludes that SAP policies are responsible for the economic 
recovery that began in 1984, but he warns of the major weaknesses of adjustment, 
namely, the indifference of the IMF and the World Bank to the living standards of 
Ghanaians.34 Parfitt (1995) contends that improvements in Ghana’s economy have 
resulted from economic liberalization, but he warns that Ghana remains vulnerable 
because it has not diversified from its traditional exports.35 
                                                 
29 Ardeshir Sepehri, “Back to the Future? A Critical Review of ‘Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results and the Road Ahead,’” Review of African Political Economy 21, no. 62 (December 1994): 559–
568. 
30 Donald L. Sparks, “Review: Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead by World 
Bank,” African Studies Review 38, no. 3 (December 1995): 114. 
31 Gavin M. Hilson, “Structural Adjustment in Ghana: Assessing the Impacts of Mining-Sector 
Reform,” Africa Today 51, no. 2 (2004): 72. 
32 Nicholas Amponsah, “Ghana’s Mixed Structural Adjustment Results: Explaining the Poor Private 
Sector Response,” Africa Today 47, no. 2 (2000): 9–32. 
33 Ho-Won Jeong, “Ghana: Lurching Toward Economic Rationality,” World Affairs 159, no. 2 
(October 1996): 65. 
34 Jon Kraus, “The Struggle Over Structural Adjustment in Ghana,” Africa Today 38, no. 4 (4th Qtr., 
1991): 19–37. 
35 Trevor W. Parfitt, “Adjustment for Stabilisation Or Growth? Ghana and the Gambia,” Review of 
African Political Economy 22, no. 63 (March, 1995): 55–72. 
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So the debate rages on. The success of economic liberalization in Ghana remains 
a contentious topic. Part of the problem is that none of the aforementioned studies 
controlled for universal regional factors. Fosu, one of the proponents of economic 
liberalization in Ghana, even acknowledges this weakness in his own research.36 
For example, the oil supply shocks of the 1970s were of course partly responsible 
for the economic decline of many SSA nations. This makes it difficult to parse the real 
reason for Ghana’s economic decline during that time period. Ghana implemented some 
decidedly protectionist policies during the 1970s while dealing with the worldwide oil 
shortage. Most agree that both factors impacted Ghana’s economy negatively, but to what 
extent? This study controls for universal regional factors—such as the oil supply shock of 
the 1970s—in an effort to clearly identify Ghana-specific variables that have impacted 
the economy. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this study is 1961 to the present (because these are the years for 
which data is available from the World Bank), but this study focuses on the years 1966, 
1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984, and 2011, because these are the years that Ghana’s 
GDP deviated significantly from that of the region indicating that Ghana-specific factors 
were influencing the economy. This is how universal regional factors are controlled. 
The methodology for this study utilizes process-tracing in order to test the 
economic liberalization theory. Process-tracing is useful for evaluating complex 
systems—like a state’s economy—because it seeks to differentiate causal mechanisms 
from correlational relationships.37 Process-tracing can be used to “identify the 
intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”38 This  
 
                                                 
36 Augustin Kwasi Fosu, Emerging Africa: The Case of Ghana (Paris: The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2000), 24 
37 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. London: MIT Press, 2005. 
38 Ibid., 206–207. 
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study attempts to do just that, to identify the intervening causal process between 
independent variables—economic policies—and the outcome of the dependent variable—
GDP growth. 
Process-tracing is superior to alternative methodologies for this particular 
research question because the research question being addressed requires the deliberate, 
detailed analysis of individual economic policies and their impact on the GDP growth of 
the country. And these policies—as independent variables—must be differentiated from 
other independent variables such as geopolitical events or other non-policy variables; 
additionally, the nature of their relationship to the outcome must be established as causal 
or correlational.  
Hence, this study examines all pertinent economic policies—protectionist and 
liberal—implemented in Ghana prior to each of the eight “deviation periods” previously 
identified. The intent is to answer the following questions. What policies were 
implemented prior to the eight deviation periods? Were they protectionist policies or 
liberal policies? Did protectionist policies precede declining deviations? Did liberal 
policies precede improving deviations? 
Some policies of course had an immediate, measurable impact on the economy. 
Other policies are more difficult to gauge, especially if an immediate impact is not clear 
and a causal relationship cannot be established. In any case, all policies are analyzed, 
their impact evaluated, and a determination is made as to whether they impacted the 
economy in a meaningful way. 
Non-policy geopolitical events that potentially impacted the economy are 
addressed as well. For example, when a military coup occurred prior to a deviation 





The next eight sub-sections of this chapter correspond to each of the eight “years 
of significant deviation”39 previously identified for Ghana: 1966, 1975, 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1981, 1984, and 2011. The intent of analyzing each year is to confirm what caused 
the GDP deviation for that year. Was the deviation caused by economic liberalization of 
some kind, or was it simply caused by geopolitical events such as military coups, for 
example? Each of the following sections gives consideration to the geopolitical events 
that could have impacted the country’s economic performance in the given year. 
Economic policies—and whether they had a liberalizing effect or not—are also 
considered. And since the impact of geopolitical events and economic policies are often 
felt for a number of years, consideration is also given to the few years prior to the year 
being analyzed.  
A. 1966 
In 1966, Ghana’s GDP percent change was -4.3 percent, 6.8 percent lower than 
the Sub-Saharan Africa average.40 What caused this deviation? 
The British government recognized Ghana’s independence on March 6, 1957, and 
the country became a republic on July 1, 1960. Kwame Nkrumah of the Convention 
People’s Party became president later that year. Initially, Nkrumah implemented a 
handful of stabilization policies, but these failed miserably,41 and the government quickly 
established itself as socialist, inward-looking, and protectionist.  
                                                 
39 A year of “significant deviation” is one in which Ghana’s GDP growth rate deviated significantly—
more than 5.8 percent—from the regional (SSA) growth rate.  
40 GDP percent change is reflected in constant prices in the national currency. The World Bank, “GDP 
Growth,” The World Bank, accessed August 9, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
41 Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of 
Continuity,” African Studies Review 42, no. 2 (September 1999): 46. 
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During the Nkrumah regime, the government’s constituents wanted a bigger 
government, rapid industrialization, and economic self-sufficiency.42 In order to meet 
these demands, Nkrumah pursued policies of high public spending, and he oversaw the 
establishment of state owned enterprises. He also launched a seven-year development 
plan in 1963–1964, which increased government spending in support of import 
substitution policies. 43 
The government had a problem with balance of payments, and it wanted to protect 
domestic industry. The classic policy options in this case are trade restrictions and 
currency devaluation. The government chose trade restrictions, believing them to be more 
favorable than currency devaluation. In addition, foreign exchange reserves were 
shrinking, so the government began to borrow externally. On top of that, price controls 
were implemented, which led to shortages, inflation, and corruption.44 And the 
nationalization of large, commercial firms, by most accounts, only served to undermine 
the economy.45 To make matters worse, Nkrumah’s policies regarding outside 
investment were schizophrenic at best, sometimes encouraging them, sometimes 
discouraging them. This led to a negative impact on the economy and a dramatic drop in 
currency value.46 
Prior to Nkrumah’s tenure as president government projects were largely funded 
by the export of cocoa, but the decline of cocoa prices in the early 1960s led to a 
significant imbalance of payments as the government continued to fund rapid 
industrialization. The government borrowed heavily from the international banking 
system, engaged in deficit financing, and raised taxes in order to continue with its public 
projects. Public discontent followed, and Nkrumah soon found himself out of a job.47  
                                                 
42 Ho-Won Jeong, “Economic Reform and Democratic Transition in Ghana,” World Affairs 160, no. 4 
(April 1998), 219. 
43 Augustin Kwasi Fosu, Emerging Africa: The Case of Ghana (Paris: The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2000). 
44 Ibid., 20–22. 
45 David E. Apter, “Ghana’s Independence: Triumph and Paradox,” Transition, no. 98 (2008), 6–22. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ho-Won Jeong, “Economic Reform and Democratic Transition in Ghana,” World Affairs 160, no. 4 
(April, 1998), 219. 
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After six years of increasingly authoritarian policies, Nkrumah was deposed. In 
February 1966, army officers Colonel E. K. Kotoka, Major A. A. Afrifa, Lieutenant 
General (retired) J. A. Ankra, and Police Inspector General J. W. K. Harlley led a 
military coup in order to wrest power from Nkrumah.48  
In sum, Nkrumah pursued some overwhelmingly protectionist—as well as 
socialist—policies, and the economy suffered for it. To be fair, it is not clear whether the 
poor economic performance in 1966 was due to the protectionist economic policies or the 
coup or both. But an important correlation has been established. 
This concludes the analysis of 1966, but the few years following 1966 should be 
explored briefly before proceeding to the next “deviation year.” The reason is because the 
National Liberation Council implemented a significant reversal of economic policies 
soon after the removal of Nkrumah, and these policies should be examined since they 
represent such a dramatic shift in economic philosophy.   
Beginning in July 1967, Afrifa and Kotoka—and the NLC—began working to 
improve the economy. The IMF/World Bank put a stabilization package on the table, and 
Ghana’s military government had little choice but to accept it. The purpose of the plan 
was to bolster the economy and control inflation.49  
The government implemented a policy of austerity and market liberalization. To 
this end, the currency was devalued by 43 percent and import duties were lowered on 
many important commodities. Additionally, controls on state production were loosened. 
Then, when Busia and his Progress Party came to power in 1969, the liberal policies 
implemented by Afrifa and Kotoka were continued.50 
Notably, this period of liberalization led to a number of years of positive GDP 
numbers. In 1969, the GDP improved six percent. In 1970, the improvement was 9.7 
percent. And in 1971, the improvement was 5.2 percent. These years were not closely 
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examined in this study because they are not “deviation years.” That is to say, Ghana’s 
economic performance for those years was roughly in line with that of the region. So it is 
impossible to parse Ghana-specific causal factors and—their effect on GDP change—
from regional factors.  
Even so, it is important to highlight this period of economic liberalization if for no 
other reason than to acknowledge that it occurred and to associate it with an improving 
economy. Despite the macroeconomic improvements in the country, popular support 
waned for Busia’s economic stabilization measures,51 and ultimately Busia lost power 
because of this.52 
B. 1975 
This section of the study focuses on 1975 since that year is a “deviation year,” but 
it is important to note the performance of Ghana’s economy for 1972, 1973, and 1974. 
These are not “deviation years” as defined in this study’s methodology, so they will not 
be evaluated closely, nor can they be used as evidence to support the thesis of this study. 
Still, important correlations can be made, namely that the reversal of economic 
liberalization policies was followed by years of poor economic performance in Ghana.  
On January 13, 1972, Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, 
commander of Ghana’s First Army Brigade, led a military coup, seizing control of Ghana 
from Prime Minister Busia and the Progress Party. Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong—
soon promoted to General—brought with himself to power the National Redemption 
Council (NRC). 53 
Shortly after Acheampong seized power, he reversed Busia’s liberal economic 
policies. Then, Ghana underperformed the region for three years in a row. However, the 
difference in performance when compared to the region is not enough to definitively 
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claim a causal relationship between the policy reversal and the economic performance. 
Indeed, the impact of the coup itself must also be considered, but again, a direct 
relationship cannot be established, only a correlational one.  The fact is, Acheampong 
reversed a number of economic liberalization policies, and then the economy 
underperformed the region for a number of years. 
1975, on the other hand, is a significant “deviation year.” Ghana’s GDP percent 
change that year was -12.4 percent, 13.5 percent lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa 
average.54 This is a huge deviation from the regional average. Indeed, this is the largest 
deviation in the history of the country. So again, the question is, why? 
Essentially, 1975 was a continuation of the economic policies of the previous 
three years since Busia’s removal. Fosu (2000) sums it up nicely, writing,  
Various experiments with controls were tried during this period. These 
included: variable purchase taxes, selective import duties, ad-valorem 
license levies, differential credit restrictions for exports and imports, and 
outright prohibition of the importation of all textiles and textile goods in 
1975.55 
 These controls led to a number of problems, including hoarding, shortages, 
inflationary pressures, and inefficiencies.56 Then, world oil prices rose sharply, 
quadrupling between October 1973 and January 1974.57  
Oil prices certainly explain some of Ghana’s poor economic performance in 1975, 
but they cannot explain why Ghana underperformed the region so dramatically. This is 
because the price of oil was a universal causal factor impacting the entire world. Indeed  
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the average GDP for all countries dropped from 6.6 percent in 1973 to .9 percent in 1975, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa saw a GDP drop from 4.2 percent to 1.0 percent over the same 
time period. 58 
One could argue that Ghana was particularly susceptible to oil prices. But if this is 
true, there must be a reason why it was susceptible. Perhaps it was especially susceptible 
because of the protectionist policies that were in place. Indeed, the evidence suggests this 
is the case. Ghana’s economic policies had led to a situation where it lacked the foreign 
exchange and credit to buy fuel. As a result, transportation suffered, as did industry. On 
top of that, poor price management and urbanization led to a decline in food 
production.59  In the end, Ghana experienced its single worst GDP change in the nation’s 
history. Acheampong’s protectionist regime was the root cause. His protectionist policies 
and his reversal of Busia’s devaluation created an economic system that was especially 
vulnerable to the oil shocks of the mid-1970s.60 
C. 1976 
In October 1975, the era of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) began (1975–
1978). The economic policies of the SMC were, generally speaking, protectionist and 
socialist in nature. 61 As a result, Ghana’s GDP percent change for that 1976 was -3.5 
percent, 8.4 percent lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average.62  
The SMC was composed of a few senior military officers who came together in 
order to replace the existing ruling council. The purpose of the SMC was to reinforce and 
expand military influence over the government. The philosophy of the SMC was  
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predicated on the belief that the country’s problems were simply the result of poor 
organization. Members of the SMC believed they could address chronic problems by 
employing military organization and thinking.63 
Senior military officers took charge of the ministries and began to manage all 
major government affairs. Junior officers and sergeants assumed responsibility for local 
administration in every government department. This included parastatal organizations as 
well.64 
As soon as the SMC finished consolidating power, it implemented a number of 
socialist and protectionist economic policies, further reversing Busia’s earlier efforts to 
liberalize the economy. These policies included—among other things—massive 
investment in agriculture. Other policies were implemented in order to reduce 
dependence on foreign exchange. The SMC believed that economic development could 
be accomplished through self-sufficiency, by relying heavily on domestic resources. This 
was accomplished in part by imposing protectionist policies such as heavy regulations on 
imports. The government also implemented a number of socialist programs that benefited 
rural communities and public employees.65  
Unfortunately, these programs proved to be extremely costly, and the country was 
not bringing in enough income from exports to cover the added costs. In the end, the 
national consumer price index rose dramatically. In fact, it went from 226.7 in 1972 to 
1,729.2 in 1977. And the bulk of the price increases were on food.66 
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In the final analysis, 1976 was a terrible year, economically. Ghana 
underperformed the region by 8.4 percent. The SMC’s protectionist and socialist 
economic policies were a total disaster. 67 
D. 1978 
Ghana’s economic policies in 1978 were a continuation of the socialist and 
protectionist policies from the previous five years. With one exception, General 
Acheampong and the SMC did not make any significant changes to the existing policies. 
And something strange happened that year. Ghana’s GDP percent change was 8.5 
percent, 7.6 percent higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average.68 Ghana, under its 
socialist and protectionist regime, had underperformed the region for six of the seven 
previous years; now, suddenly, Ghana dramatically outperformed the region. So what 
accounts for this change? If Acheampong and the SMC were simply continuing with the 
same policies, then there must be another explanation.  
Acheampong and the SMC did make one significant change. They devalued the 
cedi.69 This had an immediate impact on the price of exports, making them attractive on 
the international market, which led to a significant increase in GDP for the year. Had this 
devaluation not occurred, the GDP would not have performed as well as it did. 
In any event, this improvement in exports was not enough to solve Ghana’s 
overall economic crisis. By July of 1978, the economy was still in shambles. Inflation 
was close to 300 percent. Basic subsistence commodities were in short supply. And cocoa 
production fell dramatically to half its 1964 peak. As a result, political pressure increased 
as constituents called for reform.  
A number of groups organized demonstrations. Acheampong responded by 
outlawing many of these organizations. He also imprisoned around 300 of his 
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opponents.70  In the end, Acheampong was unable to fix the economy, and there was no 
relief in sight, so the SMC acted, forcing Acheampong to resign and replacing him with 
Lieutenant General Frederick Akuffo who promised to hold elections and transition to a 
civilian government by July 1, 1979.71 
E. 1979 
In 1979, Ghana’s GDP percent change was -2.5 percent, 6.4 percent lower than 
the Sub-Saharan Africa average.72 This deviation from the region is difficult to explain 
definitively. This is because there were a number of factors that must be considered, any 
one of which, or any combination of which, may have been responsible for Ghana’s 
terrible economic performance that year. 
Perhaps the most significant development in Ghana in 1979 was the fact that three 
different governments ran the country that year. General Akuffo’s military government, 
which had been in power since July of 1978, was ousted on June 4, 1979 by Flight 
Lieutenant John J. Rawlings in a military coup. Then in September, Rawlings handed 
over power to the newly elected President, Dr. Hilla Limann.73 This instability—three 
different governments—may have been responsible for some of Ghana’s poor economic 
performance in 1979. It is impossible to say for certain. 
Additionally, severe drought and bush fires ravaged the countryside in 1979 
impacting agriculture and food production, which led to a decrease in agricultural 
exports.74 This reduced productivity of course affected the GDP change for the year.  
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But there were other effects as well. The diminished agriculture sector created a 
situation in which Ghana could not benefit from rising cocoa prices. On top of that, cocoa 
farmers were receiving lower wages than their counterparts in Togo and Cote D’Ivoire, 
so a significant number of farmers began to smuggle their cocoa across the border.75 This 
would affect exports, so it would of course have a negative impact on GDP as well. 
On top of all that, economic policies were protectionist in the years leading up to 
1979 and for most of 1979, itself. Akuffo’s policies were inward-looking and 
protectionist. Rawlings implemented a few reforms, but for the most part, he tightened 
economic controls. And Limann—who would eventually pursue economic liberalization 
for the country—did very little during 1979.76 
So, to sum up the situation in Ghana in 1979, the country suffered extreme 
political volatility, severe agricultural challenges, and continued protectionist policies. 
For this reason, it is difficult to say what caused the country’s terrible economic 
performance that year.  Most would probably agree that all three factors were, to some 
extent or another, responsible. 
F. 1981 
In September 1979, Dr. Hilla Limann won the presidential election, and Rawlings 
handed over power. Limann and the People’s National Party pursued economic 
liberalization over the course of the next two years,77 and by 1981, Ghana’s GDP percent 
change was 10.6 percent, 8.6 percent higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average.78  
Limann was the president of Ghana until the end of 1981. During his few years in 
office, he made some notable steps toward economic liberalization; this was the first 
significant economic policy shift toward liberalization since Busia’s policies in the early 
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1970s. Limann pursued monetary policies recommended by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). He also focused heavily on agricultural production in an effort to increase 
export earnings. Part of the agricultural focus included an increase in cocoa producer 
prices. In addition, he worked to reduce the budget deficit.  
Unfortunately for Limann, cocoa exports declined and the budget deficit 
continued to grow. And economic liberalization proved to be too painful for the 
electorate, especially the educated, who were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the 
government. Eventually accusations of government corruption surfaced,79 and Limann’s 
narrow support base among the middle class became even smaller, creating an 
opportunity for the Rawlings military coup at the end of 1981.80 
To conclude, during 1980 and 1981, Limann introduced a number of significant 
reforms in order to liberalize the economy, and in 1981, Ghana saw a surge in GDP that 
far outperformed the region. 
G. 1984 
On December 31, 1981, Rawlings and the PNDC led military coup (Rawlings’ 
second coup) in order to remove Limann and the PNP from power.81 Rawlings initially 
implemented a number of tightening controls, but in 1983, he shifted dramatically toward 
economic liberalization.82 And in 1984, Ghana’s GDP percent change was 8.1 percent, 
5.8 percent higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average. Notably, Ghana achieved these 
startling GDP numbers in 1984 in spite of a number of very challenging socioeconomic 
pressures that one would normally expect to adversely affect GDP.83 
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In an effort to consolidate support, Rawlings and the Provisional National 
Defense Council (PNDC) spent the first 18 months in power maintaining popular 
protectionist and socialist policies. The low income section of the populace enjoyed 
controlled rents, low transportation fares, and other inexpensive necessities as a part of 
these policies.84 
Unfortunately for Rawlings, these programs were expensive, and as a result, 
inflation spiked as did the government deficit.85 In addition, a number of state-owned 
enterprises were not performing, so they were creating an additional burden on the 
government’s coffers. In fact, the total amount of subsidies for these enterprises cost the 
government up to nine percent of its annual expenditure.86 
On top of all that—as the result of farmer exploitation and poor agricultural 
pricing policy—cocoa production continued to decline (from 403,000 tons in 1970 to 
179,000 tons in 1983). And to make matters worse, Nigeria expelled 2,000 workers, most 
of whom returned to Ghana creating an additional burden on the government. These 
workers returned to a country that was suffering severe drought and bush fires, which 
affected agriculture and food production as well as hydroelectric power and industrial 
production.87 
The economic troubles of 1981 and 1982 capped off a decade of decline. From 
1970 to 1982, income per capita fell by 30 percent; real wages fell by 80 percent; import 
volume fell by 66 percent; real export earnings fell by 50 percent; Ghana’s export to GDP 
ratio dropped from 21 percent to four percent; the domestic savings rate fell from 12 to 
three percent; the investment rate fell from 14 percent of GDP to two percent; and the 
budget deficit rose from 0.4 to 14.6 percent of total government spending.88 So, by any 
measure, the economy was not doing well. Indeed, this was an economic crisis.  
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Rawlings and the PNDC had to find a solution to these problems. The solution 
they chose was the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which launched in 1983 with the 
support of the IMF and the World Bank. The program was executed in two phases, ERP I 
and ERP II. Phase one was the stabilization phase and took place from 1983 to 1986. The 
intent of this phase was to arrest the decline of the economy. Phase two occurred from 
1987 to 1989. This was the structural adjustment and development phase, which focused 
heavily on reforming social services and curbing subsidies.89 
ERP II is important to understand when analyzing the long term impact of 
structural reform in Ghana, but for purposes of this study, ERP I is much more relevant. 
ERP I began in 1983, and Ghana’s GDP change significantly outperformed the region in 
1984, so much of this section will focus on ERP I.  
Economic liberalization is often difficult to implement because of the lack of 
public support. This was the case for Busia in the early 1970s, and it was the case for 
Limann in the early 1980s. But the situation was different for Rawlings in 1983. Indeed, 
the economy was so bad that many actually accepted the policies of ERP I.90 And those 
who did not accept the policies were forced by the PNDC to temper their opposition.91 
The first order of business for the PNDC was the budget deficit. The PNDC 
implemented a number of reforms in order to narrow the deficit. These reforms included 
the elimination of subsidies for basic necessities as well as reduced spending for 
education and welfare programs. This caused some tension among some groups—
students, labor groups, etc.—but there were no widespread demonstrations or riots that 
threatened the government.92 
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The government instituted a number of other reforms as well. It devalued the 
currency, removed price controls on manufacturing products, and privatized government 
industries.93 The PNDC also implemented free trade policies as well as other traditional 
liberal economic reforms.94 
In return for the implementation of ERP I, the World Bank sent a significant aid 
package. Part of this package included an interest-free loan worth $3.1 million for 
bilateral Chinese development projects—irrigation projects in the Volta region, grain 
depots, rice-grinding mills, a bank, a sweater mill, and several school buildings.95 
These projects were successful; Ghana was able to increase its export of 
agricultural crops, and it was able to improve the standard of living in all the 
communities where these projects were built. Development projects like these as well as 
those sponsored by other countries led to the success of the ERP.96 
In 1984, Ghana’s GDP percent change exceeded that of the region by 5.8 percent, 
and over the next 28 years, Ghana outperformed the region 25 of 28  times. And for the 
three years when Ghana underperformed the region, the difference was negligible, each 
occurrence being less than one percentage point off.97 So there is clearly a correlation 
between implementation of the ERP and positive GDP change. 
H. 2011 
From 1984 until the present, Ghana has continued its policies of economic 
liberalization, and the results are impressive. Between 1984 and 2011, Ghana’s annual 
GDP growth was consistent, and, with only a few exceptions, the country outperformed 
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the region. Additionally, the growth was quite stable. There were no “deviation years” 
during that time period, years in which the GDP change deviated from that of the region 
by more than 5.8 percent. Then, toward this end of this time period, in 2011, Ghana’s 
GDP percent change spiked considerably, hitting 15 percent, 11 percent higher than the 
Sub-Saharan Africa average.98 As noted in the introduction to this study, 15 percent 
growth places Ghana at the very top of the list of fastest growing economies in the world. 
Much of the growth for 2011 was certainly due to oil revenues from the Jubilee 
oil field. But, again, oil alone does not explain Ghana’s economic success in 2011. When 
oil revenues are excluded, Ghana’s GDP change was still 7.5 percent for 2011.99 This 
still places Ghana in the top 30 percent of the world’s economies in terms of growth.100 
So, whether one includes oil revenues or not, Ghana’s economy is growing quite rapidly, 
and as with all other deviation years examined in this study, the question is why? 
The oil revenue has been accounted for, so what explains the other 7.5 percent 
growth? Arguably, the answer is economic liberalization policies. Perhaps one of the 
most successful initiatives of late has been Ghana’s policy focus on strengthening the 
private sector. Indeed, the government now considers the private sector a partner in the 
development of infrastructure. Private capital is now flowing into infrastructure projects, 
which of course boost the economy. Other policies that have led to growth include 
pension reforms, stock exchange tax holidays, and incentives that encourage investment 
in the stock market.101  
Other reforms include the financial sector strategic plan (FINSSP) and inflation 
targeting policies, both pursued by John Kufuor and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). John 
Atta Mills continued these policies when he and the National Democratic Congress 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ferdinand Bakoup, Republic of Ghana Country Strategy Paper (Accra, Ghana: African 
Development Bank, 2012). 
100 GDP percent change is reflected in constant prices in the national currency. The World Bank, 
“GDP Growth,” The World Bank, accessed August 9, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
101 African Development Bank, African Economic Outlook 2012: Ghana (Tunis, Tunisia: African 
Development Bank, 2012). 
 28 
(NDC) took office in 2009. He implemented other liberal policies as well. These include  
FINSSP II, the Ghana industrial policy (GIP), and the private sector development strategy 
(PSDS). These policies helped to strengthen the financial sector and develop capital 
markets. 102 
Leading up to 2011, Ghana had been consistently implementing economic 
liberalization policies since 1983. And while a causal relationship is difficult to establish, 
a correlational relationship is not. The fact is, Ghana had been pursuing liberal economic 
policies for almost three decades. And the result? The economy has improved 
consistently, and in 2011 it improved dramatically. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DATA REVIEW 
So do economic liberalization policies lead to positive deviation years (years in 
which the GDP growth exceeds the region’s by 5.8 percent or more)? Let us review the 
data.  
Protectionist policies were in place from 1961 to 1966, which was a negative 
deviation year. The regime implemented some tentative liberal policies during 1966 and 
1967, but was generally protectionist until 1975, when it experienced a negative deviation 
year. Protectionist policies then continued until 1979. Ghana experienced a positive GDP 
deviation in 1978 and a negative one in 1979. Then Limann implemented some notable 
steps toward liberalization from 1979 to 1981, and the country experienced a positive 
deviation year in 1981. Rawlings continued these liberalization policies, and the country 
then experienced another positive deviation in 1984. The liberalization policies have 
continued to the present with a notable spike in GDP growth occurring in 2011.103 
B. FINDINGS 
A review of all the available data makes clear that economic liberalization 
policies implemented in any given year do not necessarily predict that the following year 
will be a positive deviation year, nor do protectionist policies necessarily predict a 
negative deviation year. So the implementation of protectionist policies in any given year 
will not necessarily cause a GDP spike in the following year. 
In fact, there are a number of one-, two-, and three-year periods of consistent 
economic policies, protectionist and liberal, which did not immediately lead to a 
deviation year. Indeed, one of the deviation years, 2011, was preceded by 29 years of 
economic liberalization policies, and they ‘did not all lead to dramatic spikes in GDP 
growth in the following year. In fact, only two of those years preceded acute spikes in 
GDP growth (1984 and 2011). So it is clear that economic liberalization policies do not 
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necessarily cause immediate acute spikes in GDP growth. And the inverse is true as well, 
that protectionist policies do not cause immediate acute drops in GDP growth. 
However, there is one important conclusion that can be inferred from the data. 
Every negative deviation year was preceded by protectionist policies, and, with one 
exception (which is easily explained),104 every positive deviation year was preceded by 
economic liberalization policies. This relationship suggests that the nature of economic 
policies (liberal versus protectionist) do not necessarily cause large, acute GDP 
movement, but they may be prerequisites for significant GDP movement in any given 
year. To state this more clearly, positive GDP growth deviations of 5.8 percent or more 
were always preceded by years in which economic liberalization policies were in place. 
And negative GDP growth deviations of 5.8 percent or more were, with one easily 
explained exception, always preceded by years in which protectionist policies were in 
place. 
The country has never experienced a GDP decline of more than 5.8 percent in any 
given year when economic liberalization policies were in place the prior year. This 
suggests that economic liberalization policies may have a preventive effect on immediate, 
acute GDP decline. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
So what does this mean? Essentially, proponents of economic liberalization now 
have a little more support for their views. If economic liberalization policies limit 
immediate, acute drops in GDP, then policymakers now have one more reason to 
implement such policies. 
If the goal is continued economic growth, then Ghana should of course continue 
with its current economic liberalization, but what about the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
 
                                                 
104 The one exception (1978) is explained by Acheampong’s devaluation of the cedi. This devaluation 
made exports more attractive on the international market, leading to a significant increase in GDP for the 
year. Had this devaluation not occurred, the GDP would not have performed as well as it did. This is 
further explained in section III. D. of this paper. 
 31 
The United States and Europe—indeed, the entire world—would like to see all countries 
in the region prosper. As such, policymakers should consider implementation/expansion 
of economic liberalization policies throughout SSA. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Now that each of the eight deviation years have been examined, it would be 
valuable to look at another dimension of this problem. Another way to parse the data 
would be to compare two broader time periods, specifically, 1961—1984 and 1985—
present. The former was a time of great political105 and economic volatility, and the latter 
was far more stable. In fact, seven of the eight dramatic deviation periods examined in 
this study occurred between 1961 and 1984. Additionally, from 1961—1984, Ghana 
experienced an average annual GDP growth of 1.9 percent while from 1985 to the 
present, the country experienced an annual GDP growth of 5.5 percent.106 So it would be 
worthwhile to study these two time periods separately in an effort to identify the causal 
factors responsible for the different outcomes. 
Additionally, GDP change may not be the best measure of a country’s economic 
condition. After all, GDP is only a measure of the goods and services produced by a country 
during any given period of time. And GDP change is simply a measure of GDP variations 
from one year to the next. Unquestionably, it is an important economic measure, but there are 
certainly other measures that may be useful. Indeed purchasing power parity (PPP) might be 
a better measure of economic prosperity. Poverty rates also an important measure of a 
country’s economic condition. As such it might be valuable to repeat this study using these 
two measures instead of GDP change. One could use a similar methodology in which 
deviation years are identified as a means of controlling for universal regional factors. Further, 
one could apply this same methodology to other countries in the region in order to see if 
outcomes are similar.  
                                                 
105 Ghana experienced nine changes of government between 1957 and 1984. 
106 GDP percent change is reflected in constant prices in the national currency. The World Bank, 
“GDP Growth,” The World Bank, accessed August 9, 2013, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. 
 32 
Indeed, there are quite a few options for further study, any of which would benefit the 
academic community as well as the policymakers charged with implementing economic 
policy for developing nations. 
  
 33 
APPENDIX GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 
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